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This paper examines the differences in welfare, as measured by per capita expenditure 
(PCE), between social groups in rural India across the entire welfare distribution. The paper 
establishes that the disadvantage suffered by two historically disadvantaged groups – 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) – is underestimated when the 
comparison group is Non-SCs/STs rather than general category (mostly higher castes). The 
ST households are the most disadvantaged followed by the SC and the Other Backward 
Caste households with respect to general category households, and the disadvantage exists 
across the entire distribution. Better covariates and better returns to those covariates 
contribute to the advantage of the general category households. The findings suggest that 
the policies to raise the human capital and strengthening the other productive assets of the 
SC and the ST households must remain a focus of attention besides promoting a more active 
labor market in rural India. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the differences in welfare, as measured by per capita household expenditure 
(PCE), between social groups in rural India across the entire distribution. This is important as we show in 
later sections that the differences vary across expenditure quantiles. In this case, it is important from 
welfare and policy perspectives to know that in which part of the distribution the differences are 
concentrated, and what drives those differences? This Information will promote more specifically targeted 
policies. Specifically, we use a quantile regression decomposition technique proposed in Machado and 
Mata (2005, hereafter MM) to decompose the differences in distributions of PCE between households 
belonging to different social groups into a component that is due to differences in the distributions of the 
covariates and a component that is due to differences in the returns to those covariates.  
  Due to persistent underdevelopment, poverty and inequality have been important research areas 
in India. One of the forms through which inequality is manifested is through social groups. This inequality 
results from exclusion of certain groups from certain economic and social spheres, and the exclusion 
revolves around social processes and institutions that exclude, discriminate, isolate, and deprive some 
groups on the basis of groups’ identities like caste and ethnicity. For example, recent work by Munsi and 
Rosenzweig (2006) shows how caste based labor markets have trapped individuals in narrow 
occupational categories for generations, and persist even today. In India, there are a number of such 
excluded groups, which constitute a sizable part of population. These include former untouchables or 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). These groups put together constituted more than 
250 millions in 2001 (about 167 millions SCs, 86 millions STs), and have historically suffered in the past 
from exclusion in multiple spheres, which has led to their severe deprivations.  
  The Indian State recognized the backwardness and deprivation suffered by the SCs and the STs 
as back as in the 1950s. Legal safeguards were provided against discrimination in the Constitution. The 
government policy however, does not stop with legal safeguards against exclusion and discrimination, 
but goes beyond, and developed measures to provide equal opportunity and fair participation in the 2 
 
economic and political process of the country. The most important of the affirmative policies has been the 
`Reservation Policy’ under which specific quotas are reserved in proportion to the population in 
government and other services, educational institutions, public housing, other public spheres, and in 
various democratic bodies including the Parliament, State assemblies, and panchayat institutions from 
district, taluk, and down to the village levels. These pro-active equal opportunity measures are thus, used 
to ensure proportional participation of the SCs and the STs in various public spheres, which otherwise 
may not have been possible due to the residual and continuing caste and untouchability based exclusion 
and discrimination against the SCs and STs, in some spheres if not all. (Thorat and Mallick, 2005).  
Apart from these two disadvantaged groups, there exist a third group referred as the `Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs)’ which constitute the `the backward classes’ along with the SCs and the STs 
(Béteille, 2002). There were no direct provisions in the Constitution to benefit the OBCs, however, one of 
the directive principles of state policy said that some measures may also be adopted for the benefit of the 
OBCs without specifying what these measures should be and who the OBCs were.
1 So commissions 
were set up and since 1993, the OBCs are entitled for 27 percent reservation in public employment and 
higher education.
2    
So, broadly Indian society can be segmented into four social groups- SCs, STs, OBCs, and 
General. While the SCs, STs, and OBCs comprise together `the backward classes’, general category 
includes most of the higher castes in India.  Unlike the backward classes, the members of general 
category do not benefit from any direct affirmative action by government.  
The existence of affirmative policies for the SCs and the STs for so long has drawn a considerable 
amount of interest in social group inequality from the researchers as existence of any unfair differences 
among social groups indicate that the objectives of different existing policies to ameliorate the conditions 
                                                            
1  In contrast, the actual complete listing of castes falling under the SCs and the STs is available under Article 341 
and Article 342 of the Constitution of India since 1950. 
2  There is no political reservation for the OBCs, while recently (on April 10, 2008) Supreme Court of India upheld the 
government’s move for initiating OBC quota in government funded educational institutions. 3 
 
of these disadvantaged groups are not fulfilled yet. In addition any perceived unfair differences may have 
political implications, like social unrest and voting on the basis of social group identity.
3’
4  
The existing literature attempts to answer “is there exist any differences in living standards 
between Non-SC/ST and the SC/ST households” and if differences exist “what explains the differences”. 
Gang et al. (2002) decompose the poverty gap between the SC/ST and Non-SC/ST households using 
National Sample Survey (NSS) consumer expenditure data for year 1993-94. They find that for the SC 
households, differences in the characteristics explain the poverty gap more than the differences in the 
coefficients with 58 percent of the poverty gap attributable to the former. For the ST households, 
however, 59 percent of the poverty gap is attributable to the differences in the coefficients. Borooah 
(2005) explores the differences in mean level of income and average probability of being poor, between 
the SC/ST and Non-SC/ST Hindu households using data from NCAER HDI survey-1993. He uses the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and its extension to multinomial probability model, and finds that at least 
one-third of the average income/probability differences between Non-SC/ST Hindu and the SC/ST 
households were due to the unequal treatment of the SCs/STs. Kijima (2006b) decomposes the 
disparities in average per capita expenditure between the SC, ST and Non-SC/ST households using a 
regression based method. He finds that the component attributable to the differences in the returns to the 
characteristics contributes approximately half of the differentials. Also, the proportion of disparities 
explained by the different returns did not change much between 1983 and 1999. 
However, the existing literature has two limitations. First, the existing literature focuses on 
averages only neglecting the remainder of the distribution. However, social groups are not homogeneous 
blocks- they are basically group of communities, which differ significantly within a group (Béteille, 2002). 
This suggests a high level of heterogeneity within a social group itself. In this case, average may hide 
much more than they reveal. Second, all the existing literature focuses on explaining the differences 
                                                            
3  Caste based politics and political parties are playing increasingly important role both at state and federal levels in 
India after 1990. 
4  Some of the districts in India suffer from Naxalite movement, which is armed rebellion against official 
administration, mainly from members of lower sections of the society.  4 
 
between the SC/ST and Non-SC/ST households. Non-SC/ST households include both households from 
general category and OBCs.
5 According to NSS consumer expenditure survey, the STs and the SCs 
comprise 8.6 and 19.6 percent of Indian population in 2004-05, respectively, while the OBCs and general 
category comprise 41 and 30.8 percent of the Indian population, respectively.
6 As the OBCs constitute a 
very large category and contain castes not very far from the SCs/STs in terms of social and economic 
backwardness, the disparities between the SC/ST and Non-SC/ST households may understate the gap 
between the bottom and top tiers of caste hierarchy. Comparison of the SCs and the STs with general 
category should be true measure of disadvantage suffered by these two disadvantaged groups. 
We attempt to address both these issues using the most recent available NSS consumer 
expenditure data. We focus on the differences in the distributions of welfare between social groups in 
rural India, as almost 90 percent of the STs and 80 percent of the SCs and the OBCs live in rural India 
(Table 1).
7 Since labor market in rural India is very thin and self-employment in agricultural or informal 
sectors is the primary source of livelihood for most households, the focus is on a broader measure of 
living standard. We measure welfare by PCE and conduct the analysis at the household level. 
Consumption expenditure is considered to be a better measure of well-being over a relatively longer time 
period than income since consumption tends to be smoothed against income fluctuations (Deaton, 1997). 
Expenditure is also often preferred over income as a measure of the current standard of living in 
agricultural economies, because of measurement errors in income earning data (Walle and 
Gunewardena, 2001). 
  We advance the understanding of social group inequality in India in following ways. First, we 
distinguish households belonging to the OBCs from households belonging to general category, and 
compare the SC and the ST households with general category households. In addition, we also examine 
                                                            
5 One possible reason for this kind of focus is limitation put by data prior to 1999-00, which do not distinguish 
between general category and OBCs. National Sample Surveys and National Family Health Surveys, two major 
datasets used by researchers, started distinguishing OBCs and general category from 1999-00. 
6 Census data does not provide information about the OBCs. According to Census of India 2001, the STs and the 
SCs comprise 8.2 percent and 16.2 percent of India's total population. 
7  According to Census of India 2001, 92 percent of the STs and 80 percent of the SCs live in rural India. 5 
 
the differences in welfare between the OBC and general category households. Second, unlike previous 
literature, we examine the differences over the entire distribution. Our quantile regression framework 
allows for the covariates to have marginal effects (returns) that vary with household’s position in the 
welfare distributions. Mean regression cannot reveal such variation. Third, we decompose the 
differences in the PCE distributions using the MM (2005) method into a part attributable to differences in 
the covariates (covariate effect) and a part attributable to differences in the returns to those covariates 
(coefficient effect). The advantage of the MM (2005) method is that it captures the heterogeneity in the 
coefficient and the covariate effects across the entire distribution. 
The findings of the paper are following. First, the disadvantage suffered by the SC and ST 
households is underestimated if one compares these two disadvantaged groups with Non-SC/ST 
households because of presence of the OBC households. The OBC households are themselves 
disadvantaged compared with general category households across the entire distribution. Second, the 
ST households are the most disadvantaged, followed by the SC and the OBC households compared to 
general category households. For the SC and the OBC households, the disadvantage increases with the 
household position in the PCE distribution. But, for the ST households, the disadvantage is almost 
uniform over most of the lower half of the distribution before it increases with quantiles in upper half of the 
distribution. Third, for the differences in PCE between general category and OBC households, the 
contribution of the covariates (coefficient) is larger than the contribution of the coefficient (covariate) 
below the median (above the median). For the differences between general category and SC 
households, the covariate effect dominates over most of the distribution. For difference between general 
category and ST households, the coefficient (covariate) effect dominates in lower (upper) half of the 
distribution.  
  The findings bring out the starling disadvantage of the STs compared to general category. The 
findings suggest that the policies to raise the human capital and strengthening the other productive 
assets of households belonging to the backward classes (especially the STs and SCs) must remain a 
focus of attention. However, what is less certain is that whether this will be sufficient to eliminate the 6 
 
disadvantage suffered by these two groups. Geographical isolation of the STs may be one major reason 
for different returns to the ST households; however, discrimination cannot be overruled. Moreover, for the 
SCs, the geographical isolation is not an important issue. It is important to promote a more active labor 
market in rural India as the market mechanism generally pushes towards similar returns to productive 
characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 investigates the results, and Section 5 discusses the findings and 
concludes with some observations about future work. 
2  Empirical Strategy  
2.1  Quantile Regression 
To begin, assume household welfare is a function of household level endowments and characteristics. 
We investigate how the relationship between log PCE and household characteristics differs between 
different social groups at various quantiles of the PCE distribution. We do this by estimating quantile 
regression in the form
8 
    | ,  ,  ,               .         .       .             .       .           .      
                                               .                                                                (1) 
where   is log PCE,     | ,  ,  ,     is the conditional     quantile of  ,       is the regression 
intercept,   is the covariate matrix, and   ,   and     are dummies for the SCs, STs and OBCs, 
respectively.        ,      ,        and       ,      ,        represent quantile intercepts and 
slope differentials for SCs, STs and OBCs relative to general category. 
                                                            





Before discussing how to decompose the differences in PCE distributions of general category (  ) 
households and households belonging any of the three backward classes (      ,    ,      ) at each 
percentile, it is useful to discuss the familiar case of mean where the standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition can easily be used. The (log) PCE for group   depends on  : 
                 ,          ,                                                                     (2) 
where    1,  . 
Under the usual assumption that the error term    has a conditional mean of zero given the 
covariates    ,      and    can be consistently estimated using OLS. The mean difference in PCE 
between general category and any of three disadvantaged group can be decomposed as: 
   Δ                                                          
                
                                 
                  
                                        (3) 
where            and        are the mean PCE by households belonging to general category and group  , 
respectively, and           and        are the corresponding mean values of explanatory variables. 
Next we move to decompose the difference in PCE at each percentile. For this, we use the MM 
(2005) method to decompose the differences in the log PCE distributions between general category 
households and SC, ST and OBC households, respectively. The MM method involves estimating a 
quantile regression for log PCE for each social group separately. We model the conditional quantile as: 
      |       
      ,       ,  ,  ,                                                           (4) 
where       is a vector of the quantile regression (QR) coefficients for social group  .  
Having fitted the conditional quantile function for each social group, the estimated parameters can 8 
 
be used to simulate the conditional distribution of   given   via an application of the probability integral 
transformation theorem: If   is a uniform random variable on [0,1], then        has the distribution  . 
Thus, if   ,   ,…,    are drawn from a uniform (0, 1) distribution, the corresponding   estimates of the 
conditional quantiles of log PCE at   ,          
         
  ,   constitute a random sample from the 
(estimated) conditional distribution of log PCE given  . To `integrate   out' and get a sample from the 
marginal distribution, instead of keeping   fixed at a given value, a random sample can be drawn from 
appropriate distribution. The algorithm below summarizes the procedure: 
Let      ,     ,       ,  ,  ,   , denote log PCE and the    covariates of group  . In 
addition, let    ;   be the joint density of the covariates for group  . We want to generate a random 
sample from the log PCE density that would prevail for group   if the conditional fitted model (4) were 
true and the covariates were distributed as    ;  . To get this 
1.  Generate a random sample of size   from a uniform (0, 1):   ,   ,…,    
2.  For the data set for group   (denoted by     , a       matrix of data on the covariates), and 
each      estimate 
     | ;   
which yields   estimates of the QR coefficients       .  
3.  Generate a random sample of size   with replacement from the rows of the covariate matrix 
    :    
    ,  1,2,3,….,  . 
4. Finally   
   
         
             
   
 
 
is a random sample of size   from the desired distribution. 
However, instead of drawing a random sample of size    from uniform distribution and estimating 
       for each   , we estimated        on a grid of      0.001,0.002,….,0.999 . Then, we draw     1000 




10  In practice, this procedure yields the same estimate and removes the sampling error from 
the first step of MM procedure (Albrecht et al., 2007). 
To construct the counterfactual density, i.e., the density function of log PCE for general category 
corresponding to the any of the disadvantaged group’s distribution of covariates, we follow the algorithm 
above for general category, but in the third step, instead of drawing the sample from general category 
covariate matrix,          , we sample it from the rows of the disadvantaged group covariate matrix, 
        ,       ,    ,      . After obtaining the desired counterfactual densities we can decompose the 
overall difference in log PCE between two groups into a part attributable to the coefficients, another to the 
covariates, and a residual. 
Let          denote the estimate of the marginal density of log PCE for general category based 
on observed sample, i.e., the empirical density, and           denote an estimate of the density of log 
PCE for general category based on the generated sample, i.e., the marginal implied by the model. 
Extending this notation to the counterfactual distributions, we may have         ;     - density that 
would have prevailed if all covariates would have been distributed as in group       ,  ,     and the 
prices paid are as in general category.  
Let    be a usual summary statistic (for instance, quantile or scale measure), we may decompose 
differences in log PCE as: 
                        
                                               
                          ;                  ;                               
                          ;                                  
                
           ;                                           
                  
                   11 
                                                            
9 To take into account the household survey weights, we implemented unequal probability sampling with 
replacement. 
10  We end up with 990,000 observations on   
 . 
11  There is another possible counterfactual which can be used in the decomposition, i.e.,        ;       - density 
that would have prevailed if all covariates were distributed as in general category and prices being paid as in group 
 . It is well known that the decomposition results may not be invariant with respect to the choice of the involved 
counterfactual (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). Therefore, the choice of a counterfactual should be guided by the 10 
 
This decomposition will then give us the contribution of the coefficients, the covariates and an 
unexplained part (residual).  
3  Data 
The analysis is based on household-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Schedule conducted by 
the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), Government of India. Data from 61st Round 
(2004-05) is used. The advantage of the data is that it is the most recent available quinquennial round 
survey and contains information whether a household belongs to OBCs.
12 The data contain information 
on household size and composition, social group, religion, monthly consumption, landholdings, 
demographic variables (age, gender, and marital status), and educational attainment of household 
members. The data covers 79,298 households residing in rural India. The sample of households is drawn 
based on a stratified random sampling procedure and all the analysis is done using survey weights. 
In the data, households are divided into four mutually exclusive groups - SCs, STs, OBCs and 
others. Others are general category who do not benefit from any affirmative action from the government, 
and include most of the higher castes in India.  
Our dependent variable is log of per capita expenditure, while the independent variables (the 
covariate matrix   ) include household characteristics, household human capital measures, land 
cultivated by household, household main occupation and dummies for states. The household 
characteristics include household size, proportion of members below age 14 and proportion of adult (age 
21-60) male and adult female in household.
13 Household human capital is measured as a series of 
dummy variables for the education level achieved by the household head. Thus, we include dummy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
question of economic interest. We believe that the prices paid to general category are the non-discriminatory prices, 
hence we chose the first counterfactual, i.e.,        ;      for our analysis. 
12  NSSO conducts thick round surveys at five-year intervals (called `Quinquennial Rounds'). The previous 
quinquennial rounds were conducted in 1972-73, 1977-78, 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94, 1999-00. The NSSO data 
started distinguishing the OBCs in the quinquennial round conducted in 1999-00. 
13  It is illegal to employ a child below the age 14, although child labor is not very uncommon in India.  11 
 
variables corresponding to primary, middle, secondary, higher secondary, graduate and postgraduate 
levels of education (reference group is households whose head is illiterate/below primary). For 
occupation, we include dummies for self employed in non agriculture, self employed in agriculture, other 
labor and others (with reference group being agricultural laborer). ‘Others’ covers households whose 
major source of income arises mostly from contractual employment with regular wages and salaries. 
  Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used. The unconditional means from our 
data establish that the `backward classes’ do indeed have lower standards of living on average than 
general category. The general category households also have better educational attainment than the 
households belonging to the `backward classes’. Incidence of poverty is highest among the STs, followed 
by the SCs and the OBCs. The general category has the lowest poverty incidence (Table 2). In addition, 
the poor belonging to the `backward classes’ suffer from a much higher poverty gap compared to the poor 
belonging to general category (Figure 1). A poor belonging to the STs is much worse than a poor 
belonging to general category/OBCs/SCs. The greater poverty depth suffered by the STs is probably the 
reason for the little decline in poverty among STs during the 1990s (the poverty ratio for the STs 
decreased from 52 to 47.6 percent between 1993-94 and 2004-05 (table 2)).  
Table 4 presents the difference in log PCE for the SC and the ST households when compared to 
Non-SC/ST and general category households, respectively. For both the SCs and the STs, the gap 
increased by an average 10 log points when general category is the comparison group instead of 
Non-SCs/STs. Also, the increase in gap is across the entire distribution. This confirms that using 
Non-SCs/STs as comparison group rather than general category underestimates the disadvantage 




We begin by running restricted version of (1) that includes only dummies for the SCs, STs, and OBCs as 
explanatory variables (other X’s are omitted). The results are given in Panel A of Table 4. The constant 
term is basically an estimate of log PCE for the general category households. The coefficients on the 
social group dummies give the unconditional difference in log PCE between a household belonging to 
that particular social group and a household belonging to general category at the       quantile of log PCE 
distribution. If the coefficients are small, they can be multiplied by 100 and interpreted as approximately 
the percentage by which particular social group households’ PCE exceed those of general category 
households’ PCE.
14 All social group dummies have negative and statistically significant coefficients at 
the select quantiles. This implies that households belonging to the `backward classes’ are disadvantaged 
compared to same ranked households belonging to general category, and the disadvantage is larger at 
higher quantiles. The disadvantage suffered by the ST households compared to general category 
households is greatest, followed by the SC households and the OBC households. More importantly, 
households belonging to the OBCs also experience a statistically significant disadvantage compared to 
households belonging to general category.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results when the full set of control variables is added to the model, 
but the slope coefficients are restricted to be identical for all the social groups. The included social group 
dummies in these regressions are interpreted as the difference in the log PCE of a household belonging 
to that particular social group relative to a household belonging to general category after we control for 
differences in the characteristics. Interestingly, when we control for the covariates, the coefficients on the 
social group dummies reduce in absolute value relative to the raw gaps at all the select quantiles. The 
                                                            
14 The approximation to percent difference in PCE is poor for larger coefficient values; exact percentage difference 
is 100                1 .  13 
 
OLS coefficients also decrease. However, all three social group dummies remain statistically significant. 
This implies that although the general category households have ‘better’ covariates compared to 
households belonging to the `backward classes’, this fails to explain fully the advantages enjoyed by 
households belonging to general category.  
Next we estimate the full model including interactions of the social group dummies with all the 
covariates as given in equation (1). This allows for different returns across covariates by social group. 
The results are given for select quantiles in appendix Table A2, while description of the variables is given 
in appendix Table A1. The results show that there exist statistically significant differences in returns of 
many covariates by social group. Hence, there exist differences in the distribution of the covariates and 
differences in the returns across social groups. To aggregate the differences in the covariates and the 
returns to those covariates, we turn to the quantile regression decomposition method proposed in MM 
(2005). 
4.2  The Decomposition 
We assume that general category is being paid the non-discriminatory prices and compare the general 
category with all three disadvantaged groups separately to summarize what explains the higher PCE of 
households belonging to general category compared to households belonging to the `backward groups’.  
4.2.1  Differences between General and OBCs 
Figure 2 plots the decomposition results for the differences in PCE between general category and the 
OBC households, and panel I of Table 6 report the results for select quantiles. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition reveals that the average differential in PCE between general category and the OBC 
households is 16 log points: the differences in the covariates explain 8.6 log points, while differences in 
the coefficients explain 7.6 log points.  
However, actual differences in PCE between general category and the OBC households differ 
across quantiles: the difference is larger at higher quantiles. The differential is 11 log points at 10
th 14 
 
percentile, 15 log points at the median, and 25 log points at the 90
th percentile. The positive difference in 
PCE across the entire distribution suggests that households belonging to general category are better off 
corresponding to the same ranked households belonging to the OBCs. Also, the rich belonging to general 
category are better off than their OBC counterparts to a greater extent than the general category poor are 
better off than their OBC counterparts. The MM (2005) decomposition reveals that the covariate effect 
dominates the coefficient effect until about median, and the coefficient effect dominates in most of the 
remainder part of the distribution. Importantly, both the covariate and the coefficient effects are larger at 
higher quantiles. The residuals are around zero across the entire distribution, which implies that our fitted 
model does reasonably well in predicting the difference in log PCE.  
4.2.2  Differences between General and SCs 
Figure 3 plots the decomposition results for the differences in PCE between general category and the SC 
households, and panel II of Table 6 reports those for select quantiles. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
reveals that average differential in PCE between general category and the SC households is 31 log 
points: differences in the returns (coefficient effect) explain 14 log points, while differences in the 
covariates (covariate effect) explain 17 log points.  
However, the differential in PCE between general category and the SC households is not only 
positive throughout but differs across quantiles: the differential is larger at higher quantiles. The 
differential is 22 log points at 10
th quantile, 29 log points at the median, and 46 log points at 90
th quantile. 
The MM decomposition reveals that the covariate effect dominates the coefficient effect over the entire 
distribution. Also both the coefficient and the covariate effects are larger at higher quantiles.  
4.2.3  Differences between General and STs 
Figure 4 plots the decomposition results for the differences in PCE between general category and the ST 
households, and panel III of Table 6 reports those for select quantiles. The average differential between 15 
 
PCE of general category and the ST households is 42 log points: both differences in the covariates and 
differences in the coefficients contribute equally to total differential observed in average PCE.  
Moving beyond the average, we find that the differential in PCE of general and the ST households 
is positive across the entire distribution: the differential is uniform until about 40
th quantile before it starts 
to increase with the quantile. The differential is 34 log points at the 10
th quantile, 37 log points at the 
median and 54 log points at 90
th quantile. The MM decomposition reveals that the coefficient effect 
dominates the covariate effects until median, while the covariate effect is larger than the coefficient effect 
after the median. While the coefficient effect is uniform over the distribution, the covariate effect is larger 
at higher quantiles.  
5  Discussion 
The results suggest that the ST households are the most disadvantaged, followed by the SC and the 
OBC households compared to the households belonging to general category. Moreover, the 
disadvantage exists across the entire distribution, and it is larger at higher quantiles. The disadvantage 
results not only due to disadvantage in terms of covariates but also due to less return to those 
characteristics. The differences in returns cannot be taken as discrimination, although we cannot rule out 
some contribution of discrimination in the existing differences. As pointed out by Walle and 
Gunewardena, 2001, the interpretation of differences in returns as discrimination is questionable when 
one thinks of the likely dynamics of the income generation process. Differences in returns may exist in the 
absence of current discrimination, due, for instance, to a history of past group disadvantage, or simply 
differential cultural development—possibly perpetuated by policies such as schooling—with a continuing 
legacy for the returns to economic characteristics. Longstanding differences in group behavior will be 
embodied in the model parameters for current levels of living.  
  Nevertheless, apart from issues of discrimination, understanding how much disparities are due to 
returns versus different characteristics remains the key to explaining the causes of inequality and 16 
 
designing appropriate policy. The study finds that the differences in the characteristics contribute majorly 
to the gap experienced by the `backward classes’. Hence, the policies to raise the human capital and 
strengthening the other productive assets of households belonging to the `backward classes’ must 
clearly remain a focus of attention. Findings from prior studies suggest that the existing reservation policy 
helps the `backward classes’. For example, Borooh et al. (2005) finds that job reservation improves the 
probability of the SC/ST getting regular salaried job. Pande (2003) finds an increase in transfers targeted 
towards the disadvantaged groups due to political reservation mandated towards them. Bertrand et al. 
(2008) studies the effects of affirmative action in admissions to engineering colleges in India, and finds 
that the affirmative policy based on caste successfully targets the financially disadvantaged. Given that 
the differences in living standards still exist and differences in characteristics contribute majorly to the 
existing differences, there is a valid case of continuance of reservation policies for more time.  
  However, it is also important to investigate why even after more than fifty years of affirmative 
policies, the disadvantage suffered by the STs and the SCs compared to general category remains high? 
Do the differences in the human capital variables result from different demand by different social groups 
or different supply of facilities? The different supply of facilities is more important in the case of the STs as 
they live in isolated areas. Census data indicate that the districts with a higher proportion of the STs are 
associated with poorer public goods such as schools, tapped water, paved roads, electricity, and health 
facilities (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2001). It is essential that the supply side bottlenecks are removed 
fast and integration of STs with the mainstream is expedited. Less demand by the disadvantaged groups 
may result from economic, cultural, or outlook about future prospects. For example, Dréze and Kingdon 
(2001) find that the overall educational disadvantage of children belonging to underprivileged social 
groups is partly mediated by lower parental motivation. There may also be information problems. There 
are a number of programs sponsored by the government which provide economic incentives to weaker 
sections of the society. What is needed is more effective transmission of information to people by local 
government and NGOs. The less demand due to cultural reasons or outlook about future prospects 17 
 
needs sustained efforts by NGOs to educate people and correct their perceptions about acquiring 
education.  
   However, what is less certain is that whether this will be sufficient to eliminate the disadvantage 
suffered by these two groups. Geographical isolation of STs may be partly responsible for different 
returns to the ST households; however, discrimination cannot be overruled. Kijima (2006b) finds that the 
differences between the ST and Non-SC/ST households are partly due to geographical differences. 
Nevertheless, for the SCs, the geographical isolation is not an important issue as they are spread over 
the entire country. To reduce the differences in returns, it is essential to promote a more active labor 
market in rural India as the market mechanism generally pushes towards similar returns to productive 
characteristics.  
  The findings that the backward classes especially the STs and SCs suffer a large disadvantage 
compared to general category across the entire distribution even today, suggest the importance of 
research on the “how welfare of different social groups have evolved over time”. Kijima (2006b) 
investigates how the average differences between social groups have evolved between 1983 and 1999. 
However, the average differences may increase or decrease with all groups gaining or all groups losing. 
It is important to ensure that high growth rate experienced by India is shared by the rural population as 
well as all social groups. It is also important to look at the entire welfare distribution rather than 
concentrating on averages as averages may not reveal the complete picture. For example, Azam (2008) 
finds that in urban India, while male workers at lower and higher quantiles experienced increase in real 
wages between 1993 and 2004, the workers at the middle quantiles didn’t experience any increase, and 
the female workers at middle quantiles did experience a decrease in real wage between the same time 
period. 
  Apart from the issues of improvement in welfare, the priority should be on ensuring that the poor 
get out of the poverty, and the non-poor do not get into poverty again. Very little improvement in the 
poverty ratio of STs is a concern area for policy makers. Moreover, one should keep in mind that people 18 
 
are often hurting behind the averages (Ravallion, 2001). In cases in which the survey data have tracked 
the same families over time ("panel data"), it is quite common to find considerable churning under the 
surface; Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) provide evidence of this for a number of countries. One can find 
that many people have escaped poverty while others have fallen into poverty, even though the overall 
poverty rate may move rather little. For example, comparing household incomes immediately after the 
1998 financial crisis in Russia with incomes of the same households two years earlier, one finds a 
seemingly small two percentage point increase in the poverty rate. However, this was associated with a 
large proportion of the population (18%) falling into poverty, while a slightly smaller proportion (16%) 
escaped poverty over the same period (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000a). A further analysis of income 
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Mean  SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean  SD  Mean SD 
log PCE  5.80  0.51 5.90 0.46 6.05 0.50 6.21  0.55  6.03 0.52
Household size  4.73  2.28 4.77 2.24 4.97 2.52 4.90  2.49  4.88 2.43
% of child in hh (pchild)  0.34  0.26 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.28  0.23  0.31 0.24
% of adult male (padmale)  0.31  0.20 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.32  0.21  0.31 0.20
% of adult female (padfemale)  0.30  0.18 0.30 0.18 0.31 0.18 0.32  0.18  0.31 0.18
Land cultivated (in hectares)  0.80  1.22 0.33 1.15 0.74 1.68 0.94  1.84  0.71 1.60
Female head*  0.10  0.30 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.11  0.31  0.11 0.31
Age of head  41.96  13.74 43.64 13.48 45.20 13.66 46.49  13.93  44.85 13.77
Education variables 
Below Primary*  0.71  0.45 0.66 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.42  0.49  0.56 0.50
Primary*  0.13  0.33 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.16  0.37  0.15 0.36
Middle*  0.10  0.30 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.19  0.39  0.15 0.35
Secondary*  0.03  0.18 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.11  0.32  0.07 0.26
Higher Secondary*  0.02  0.15 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19 0.06  0.24  0.04 0.20
Graduate*   0.01  0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.04  0.20  0.02 0.15
Post Graduate*  0.00  0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01  0.12  0.01 0.08
Occupation variables 
Others*  0.09  0.29 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.15  0.36  0.11 0.32
Self employed in 
non‐agriculture (selfnonagr)*  0.07  0.25 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.17  0.38  0.16 0.36
Agricultural Labor*  0.35  0.48 0.43 0.49 0.23 0.42 0.16  0.36  0.27 0.44
Other labor (othlab)*  0.11  0.31 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.30 0.08  0.27  0.11 0.31
Self‐employed in agriculture 
(selfagr)*  0.38  0.49 0.19 0.39 0.38 0.49 0.44  0.50  0.36 0.48


































th ‐ 0.27 ‐ 0.34 ‐0.07 ‐0.14 ‐0.22 ‐ 0.07
25
th ‐ 0.25 ‐ 0.33 ‐0.08 ‐0.16 ‐0.24 ‐ 0.08
50
th ‐ 0.28 ‐ 0.37 ‐0.10 ‐0.19 ‐0.29 ‐ 0.10
75
th ‐ 0.31 ‐ 0.43 ‐0.12 ‐0.24 ‐0.36 ‐ 0.12
90
th ‐ 0.40 ‐ 0.54 ‐0.14 ‐0.31 ‐0.46 ‐ 0.14
95
th ‐ 0.43 ‐ 0.56 ‐0.14 ‐0.34 ‐0.48 ‐ 0.14













































Constant  6.410  5.797 6.041 6.348 6.707 7.110 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SC ‐ 0.313 ‐ 0.216 ‐0.243 ‐0.290 ‐0.359 ‐0.456 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ST ‐ 0.418 ‐ 0.337 ‐0.332 ‐0.371 ‐0.430 ‐0.544 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OBC ‐ 0.162 ‐ 0.109 ‐0.120 ‐0.151 ‐0.192 ‐0.248 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B 
Constant  6.095  5.591 5.827 6.116 6.423 6.681 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SC ‐ 0.145 ‐ 0.113 ‐0.112 ‐0.131 ‐0.129 ‐0.149 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ST ‐ 0.223 ‐ 0.209 ‐0.180 ‐0.190 ‐0.189 ‐0.189 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OBC ‐ 0.060 ‐ 0.044 ‐0.048 ‐0.057 ‐0.051 ‐0.066 





























Mean*  6.41  6.25 0.16 0.76 0.86  0.00 
(0.47) (0.53)  (0.00) 
10
th  5.60  5.49 0.11 0.03 0.06  0.01 
(0.31) (0.59)  (0.09) 
25
th  5.85  5.73 0.12 0.05 0.07  0.00 
(0.41) (0.59)  (0.00) 
50
th  6.15  6.00 0.15 0.08 0.08  0.00 
(0.52) (0.50)  (‐0.02) 
75
th  6.51  6.32 0.19 0.11 0.09 ‐ 0.01 
(0.56) (0.49)  (‐0.05) 
90












Mean*  6.41  6.10 0.31 0.14 0.17  0.00 
(0.46) (0.54)  (0.00) 
10
th  5.60  5.39 0.22 0.09 0.12  0.01 
(0.41) (0.56)  (0.03) 
25
th  5.85  5.60 0.24 0.10 0.14  0.00 
(0.42) (0.57)  (0.01) 
50
th  6.15  5.86 0.29 0.13 0.16 ‐ 0.01 
(0.46) (0.56)  (‐0.02) 
75
th  6.51  6.15 0.36 0.18 0.19 ‐ 0.01 
(0.50) (0.53)  (‐0.03) 
90



























Mean*  6.41  5.99 0.42 0.21 0.21  0.00 
(0.49) (0.51)  (0.00) 
10
th  5.60  5.26 0.34 0.22 0.13 ‐ 0.01 
(0.65) (0.38)  (‐0.03) 
25
th  5.85  5.51 0.33 0.19 0.15 ‐ 0.01 
(0.58) (0.45)  (‐0.03) 
50
th  6.15  5.78 0.37 0.18 0.19  0.00 
(0.50) (0.51)  (‐0.01) 
75
th  6.51  6.08 0.43 0.19 0.25 ‐ 0.01 
(0.45) (0.58)  (‐0.03) 
90





















































































Constant    6.087***   5.486***   5.734***   6.073***   6.407***   6.689*** 
SC ‐ 0.134***   0.036   0.075 ‐ 0.101 ‐ 0.082 ‐ 0.193* 
ST ‐ 0.245***   0.085 ‐ 0.109 ‐ 0.188* ‐ 0.244*** ‐ 0.428*** 
OBC ‐ 0.058   0.079   0.051 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.043 ‐ 0.061 
hhsize ‐ 0.045*** ‐ 0.042*** ‐ 0.043*** ‐ 0.046*** ‐ 0.047*** ‐ 0.046*** 
SC Х hhsize   0.008***   0.009**   0.003   0.003 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.003 
ST Х hhsize   0.015***   0.014**   0.002   0.002   0.005 ‐ 0.005 
OBC Х hhsize   0.006**   0.006*   0.001   0.003   0.006*   0.004 
pchild ‐ 0.313*** ‐ 0.127*** ‐ 0.225*** ‐ 0.287*** ‐ 0.394*** ‐ 0.452*** 
SC Х pchild   0.022 ‐ 0.094 ‐ 0.032   0.055   0.076   0.178* 
ST Х pchild ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.388***   0.011   0.066   0.139*   0.335*** 
OBC Х pchild   0.059 ‐ 0.039   0.039   0.034   0.088   0.077 
padmale   0.215***   0.359***   0.270***   0.165***   0.149***   0.135*** 
SC Х padmale   0.026 ‐ 0.083 ‐ 0.052   0.085   0.011   0.162* 
ST Х padmale   0.071 ‐ 0.250***   0.022   0.126*   0.086   0.227** 
OBC Х padmale   0.084** ‐ 0.062   0.025   0.071   0.082*   0.118* 
padfemale   0.069**   0.182***   0.123***   0.063* ‐ 0.082** ‐ 0.046 
SC Х padfemale   0.120***   0.040 ‐ 0.014   0.063   0.119*   0.142* 
ST Х padfemale   0.015 ‐ 0.219*** ‐ 0.103   0.02   0.099   0.137 
OBC Х padfemale   0.042 ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.001   0.004   0.089*   0.064 
femalehead   0.049***   0.031*   0.043***   0.031*   0.065***   0.079*** 
SC Х femalehead ‐ 0.051** ‐ 0.068** ‐ 0.072*** ‐ 0.056* ‐ 0.051*   0.021 
ST Х femalehead   0.016 ‐ 0.018 ‐ 0.037   0.000   0.020   0.025 
OBC Х femalehead ‐ 0.022 ‐ 0.049** ‐ 0.053** ‐ 0.028 ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.008 
headage   0.003***   0.003***   0.003***   0.003***   0.002***   0.002*** 
SC Х headage   0.000 ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.002** ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.001 
ST Х headage   0.000   0.000   0.000 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.001   0.002 
OBC Х headage ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.001** ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.001 
Primary   0.095***   0.084***   0.089***   0.077***   0.097***   0.100*** 
SC Х primary ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.027 ‐ 0.018   0.005 ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.008 
ST Х primary ‐ 0.026   0.028   0.052*   0.038   0.057*   0.021 
OBC Х primary ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.002   0.011 ‐ 0.031* ‐ 0.034 
Middle   0.171***   0.179***   0.170***   0.150***   0.154***   0.164*** 
SC Х middle ‐ 0.051*** ‐ 0.093*** ‐ 0.077*** ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.019 
ST Х middle   0.03 ‐ 0.013   0.015   0.026   0.059*   0.062 













secondary   0.268***   0.234***   0.270***   0.248***   0.267***   0.279***  
SC Х secondary ‐ 0.061** ‐ 0.099*** ‐ 0.114*** ‐ 0.089*** ‐ 0.075** ‐ 0.061 
ST Х secondary   0.071*   0.095* ‐ 0.001   0.060   0.004 ‐ 0.035 
OBC Х secondary ‐ 0.028* ‐ 0.048* ‐ 0.085*** ‐ 0.028 ‐ 0.035 ‐ 0.019 
hrsecondary   0.384***   0.335***   0.385***   0.359***   0.394***   0.435***  
SC Х hrsecondary ‐ 0.018 ‐ 0.105** ‐ 0.156*** ‐ 0.072* ‐ 0.02   0.036 
ST Х hrsecondary   0.110*** ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.062   0.002   0.026   0.052 
OBC Х hrsecondary ‐ 0.070*** ‐ 0.076** ‐ 0.123*** ‐ 0.084** ‐ 0.087*** ‐ 0.056 
graduate   0.474***   0.407***   0.423***   0.434***   0.487***   0.526***  
SC Х graduate   0.002 ‐ 0.098 ‐ 0.123** ‐ 0.015   0.015 ‐ 0.009 
ST Х graduate   0.223***   0.047   0.180***   0.045   0.098*   0.166**   
OBC Х graduate ‐ 0.017 ‐ 0.051 ‐ 0.026 ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.081*    
postgrad   0.774***   0.552***   0.611***   0.700***   0.948***   1.137***  
SC Х postgrad ‐ 0.287*** ‐ 0.472*** ‐ 0.430*** ‐ 0.264** ‐ 0.260* ‐ 0.543***  
ST Х postgrad   0.164   0.517***   0.222** ‐ 0.044 ‐ 0.319** ‐ 0.077 
OBC Х postgrad ‐ 0.175*** ‐ 0.062 ‐ 0.065 ‐ 0.085 ‐ 0.365*** ‐ 0.478***  
cultland   0.037***   0.027***   0.030***   0.039***   0.046***   0.054***  
SC Х cultland ‐ 0.021*** ‐ 0.022*** ‐ 0.019** ‐ 0.008   0.021***   0.024***  
ST Х cultland ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.015** ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.011 ‐ 0.003   0.008 
OBC Х cultland ‐ 0.006* ‐ 0.002   0.003   0.007**   0.006*   0.012***  
selfnonagr   0.252***   0.166***   0.208***   0.227***   0.271***   0.331***  
SC Х selfnonagr ‐ 0.112*** ‐ 0.039* ‐ 0.087*** ‐ 0.091*** ‐ 0.119*** ‐ 0.149***  
ST Х selfnonagr ‐ 0.042 ‐ 0.04 ‐ 0.058* ‐ 0.055* ‐ 0.008 ‐ 0.053 
OBC Х selfnonagr ‐ 0.052*** ‐ 0.025 ‐ 0.048** ‐ 0.046* ‐ 0.055** ‐ 0.063**   
others   0.334***   0.216***   0.267***   0.336***   0.418***   0.470***  
SC Х others ‐ 0.180*** ‐ 0.188*** ‐ 0.129*** ‐ 0.113*** ‐ 0.154*** ‐ 0.113**   
ST Х others ‐ 0.295*** ‐ 1.082*** ‐ 0.278*** ‐ 0.090** ‐ 0.065* ‐ 0.06 
OBC Х others ‐ 0.091*** ‐ 0.080*** ‐ 0.066*** ‐ 0.090*** ‐ 0.103*** ‐ 0.090**   
othlab   0.143***   0.094***   0.145***   0.124***   0.164***   0.192***  
SC Х othlab ‐ 0.074*** ‐ 0.046* ‐ 0.097*** ‐ 0.066** ‐ 0.095*** ‐ 0.078*    
ST Х othlab ‐ 0.026   0.024 ‐ 0.038 ‐ 0.025 ‐ 0.059* ‐ 0.090*    
OBC Х othlab ‐ 0.041** ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.068*** ‐ 0.028 ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.057 
selfagr   0.196***   0.167***   0.180***   0.186***   0.216***   0.219***  
SC Х selfagr ‐ 0.035** ‐ 0.039* ‐ 0.029 ‐ 0.022 ‐ 0.081*** ‐ 0.063*    
ST Х selfagr ‐ 0.075*** ‐ 0.075*** ‐ 0.071*** ‐ 0.056** ‐ 0.057** ‐ 0.046 
OBC Х selfagr ‐ 0.016 ‐ 0.036* ‐ 0.023 ‐ 0.027 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.044*    
  Observations 79,224.                                        *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Note: The model also include state dummies not reported in the table.                       
 